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I.  Introduction 
On  17  October  I 995,  the  Court  of Justice  or the  European  Communities  delivered  its 
judgment in  Case C-450/93,  (Eckhard  Kalanke  v  Freie Hansestadt  Bremen)(l>,  which  has 
given rise to a great deal of controversy throughout Europe.  This controversy was caused by 
the  uncertainty  created by the judgment with  regard to the legitimacy of quotas  and  other 
forms of positive action aimed at increasing the numbers of  women in certain sectors or levels 
of employment. 
The  KalankQ  judgment  is  or great  signillcancc  because  it  comes  at  a  time  when  it  is 
increasingly recognized that the anti-discrimination laws which were adopted twenty years ago 
arc not  now sufficient to achieve equality for women as regards their access to employment 
and promotion. Despite some real progress made during the past decade in  this field,  the rate 
or  unemployment  amongst  women  is  higher  than  amongst  men  in  most  parts  of the 
Community.  Women still  account for the majority of the long-term  unemployed, they  often 
have low-skilled,  poorly paid and  insecure jobs and there are still  gaps in  pay between men 
and women. There arc also still not enough women to whom decision-making posts and a full 
share in  political  and economic life are open. 
Equal treatment between men and women at work constitutes a fundamental right, as has been 
acknowledged  by  the  Court  of Justice  in  its judgment of 15  June  1978  in  Case  149/77, 
Defrcnnc  IIJ<
2>.  In  particular,  as  regards  the  existence  of a  general  principle  prohibiting 
discrimination based  on  sex  in  respect  of employment  and  working conditions,  the  Court 
stated  the  case that the elimination of such  discrimination formed  part of the fundamental 
rights which constitute one of the principles of Community law and that the Court had a duty 
to ensure its observance. The principle that fundamental  rights should be respected has since 
been  enshrined in  the Treaty on  European  Union (Article F(2)). 
The ('ommission considers that, at a time when equality of opportunity for women has been 
recognized  at  the highest  level  (Essen, Cannes and  Madrid European Councils) to be a task 
of paramount importance  - together with  the  light against unemployment - it  is  crucial  to 
rcallirm  the  need  to  usc,  where  appropriate,  "positive action"  measures to promote equal 
opportunities for  women and  men,  in  particular by  removing existing factors  of inequality 
which affect women's opportunities in the employment area. 
(I) 
{2) 
[1995] ECR I-3051. 
[1978]  ECR  1365. 
2 There is  no  official  definition of "positive action"  at  Community level.  There is,  however, 
widespread agreement across the Community that the concept of  positi~e action embraces all 
measures  which  aim  to  counter  the  effects  of past  discrimination,  to  eliminate  existing 
discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity between women and men, particularly 
in  relation  to  types  or  levels  of jobs  where  members  of  one  sex  arc  significantly 
undcr-rcprcscntcd. It is  increasingly recognized to be not only a question of equity but also 
of efficiency in  the management of human resources. 
Positive action can take different forms: a first model consists of  measures  intended to remedy 
the disadvantageous  situations which  arc characteristic of women's  presence in  the labour 
market. The objective is to eliminate the causes underlying the lesser employment or career 
opportunities  still  affecting  women's  work  by  intervening,  in  particular,  at  the  level  or 
professional  orientation and  vocational  training  J\  second  model  of positive action  can  be 
traced  in  actions  favouring  the  attainment  of a  certain  balance between  family  and  work 
responsibilities  and  a  more efficient distribution of these  responsibilities between  the two 
sexes. In this case, priority is given to measures concerning the organization of  working time, 
the development of childcare infrastructure,  and the reintegration of workers in the labour 
market after a career-break. 
A  third  model  is  based  on  the idea that  postttvc  action  should  aim  to make up  for  past 
discrimination.  As a  consequence,  preferential  treatment is prescribed in favour of certain 
categories of persons.  This may take the form  of quota systems or targets.  Quotas may be 
more or less rigid. Rigid quotas arc deemed to be those determining a certain threshold to be 
reached without taking into account the qualifications and merits of persons concerned, or 
those fixing minimum requirements to be fulfilled without any possibility of having regard 
to the particular circumstances of a case.  Less rigid or flexible quotas are,  on the contrary, 
those  establishing  preferential  treatment  in  favour  of a  certain  category  provided  that 
qualifications  arc  of equal  value  in  relation  to  the job to be  done  and  that  exceptional 
circumstances may be taken  into account. 
2.  The Community's approach to  "positive action" 
The Commission has always adopted a very favourable attitude towards positive action.  In 
1984, it put forward a proposal for a recommendation on the promotion of positive action!3>, 
which was adopted by the Council. 
The recommendation invites Member States to  adopt  a  positive action  policy  designed to 
eliminate  existing  inequalities  affecting  women  in  working  life  and  to  promote  a  better 
balance between the sexes in employment in order to eliminate or counteract the prejudicial 
effects on women in employment or seeking employment which arise from existing attitudes, 
behaviour and structures based on the idea of  a traditional division of roles in society between 
men and women. Member States arc also invited to encourage the participation of women in 
various  occupations  in  those  sectors  of  working  life  where  they  arc  at  present 
under-represented,  particularly  in  the  sectors  of  the  future,  and  at  higher  levels  of 
responsibility in order to achieve better usc of  all  human resources. The recommendation also 
advises that Member Stales should take steps to ensure that positive action includes, inter <!_lia, 
(.1)  Council  Recommendation  84/635/EEC  of  I 3  December  1984  on  the  promotion  of 
positive action for women (OJ  No L 331,  19.12.1984, p.  34). 
3 .,,  f':'r  :1<:  possible,  actions  encouraging  women  candidates as  well  as  the  recruitment  and 
:'T:notion  of  women  in  sectors  and  professions  and  at  levels  where  they  arc  under-
represented,  particularly as regards positions of responsibility. 
It  is  also  important  to  recall  that  in  the  Third Medium-Term Action Programme  on 
Equal  Opportunities ( 1991-1995), which has been approved by  the Council  Resolution of 
21  May  1991(1>,  the  Commission  underlined  the need  for positive action  and  organized  a 
number of programmes specifically aimed at  promoting women's integration into the labour 
market and the improvement in  the quality of their work.  In the Fourth Action Programme 
( 1996-2000) approved  by  Council  Decision  95/593/EC(
5>,  sex  desegregation  of the  labour 
market is one of the objectives to be pursued, inter alia, through positive action. 
Within  the  Commission  itself,  a  second  positive  action  programme  for  female  staff 
(I 092-1996  ),  has  been  adopted,  in  order to  redress  the balance as regards the number of 
women in the categories and positions where they are under-represented and to promote their 
career development and to provide flanking measures making it possible for civil servants to 
reconcile professional and family commitments. Several operations are envisaged as part of 
a coherent strategy to eliminate de facto inequalities. In particular, services arc encouraged 
to  give  priority  to women  candidates in  the event of equal  qualifications  and  merits for 
recruitment,  promotion  and  appointment  to  managerial  posts,  as  long  as  women  are 
under-represented  in  a  given  grade  or  category.  To  this  end,  targets  are  set  and 
in1plemcntation  plans arc established covering a qualitative and quantitative analysis or the 
evolving situation, a set or consistent measures designed to achieve a better balance between 
male and female staff and periodical evaluations. 
3.  The f;tcts  of Kalanlu· 
i 
In  the _Kalanke case, the issue was whether a German law on positive action was compatible 
with  Directive 76/207/EEC(<>J  or whether it  exceeded the exception for positive action  laid 
down in Article 2(4) thercor:
7>.  The law of the Land of Bremen on equal opportunities in the 
public  sector  provides  that,  as  regards  both  recruitment  and  promotion  in  sectors  where 
women arc under-represented, namely if they do not represent 50% of the personnel in the 
different grades of  the category concerned, a woman having the same qualifications as a male 
applicant must be given preference over him. 
Mr Kalanke, having failed to gain a particular promotion as a result of this rule, challenged 
its validity before the German courts. The national court found that the promotion was legal 
IInder  (Ierman  law  inclllding  constitutional  law,  hut  the  question  of its  conformity  with 
Directive  7(>/~07/EEC was referred to  the Court of Justice. 
(4) 
('i) 
(h) 
(7) 
OJ  No C  142,  31.5.1991, p.  I. 
OJ  No L 335, 30.12.1995, p.  37. 
Directive 76/207/EEC of 9  February  1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training 
and promotion, and working conditions (OJ No L 39, 14.2.1976, p.  40).  · 
Article 2(4) reads as follows: 
"This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for 
men and  women, in  particular by  removing existing inequalities which affect women's 
opportunities in  the areas referred to in  Article  I (I)." 
4 The relevant provisions of the Bremen  Law on  Equal  Treatment for Men  and Women in  the 
Public Service read as  follows: 
"Appointment, assignment to an  official  post and  promotion. 
In the case of an appointment (including establishment as a civil servant or judge) which 
is  not  made for  training  purposes,  women  who  have  the  same  qualifications  as  men 
applying  for  the  same  post  arc  to  be  given  priority  in  sectors  where  they  arc 
under  -represented 
There is under-representation if women do not make up  at least half of the staff in  the 
individual pay,  remuneration and salary brackets in the relevant personnel  group within 
a department.  This also applies to the  function  levels  provided for  in  the organization 
chart." 
4.  The judgment 
In  its judgment, the Court of Justice points out that: 
the  purpose  of the  Directive  is,  as  stated  in  Article  1(1)  to  put  into  effect  in  the 
Member States the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards, inter alia, 
access to  employment including promotion.  This principle of equal  treatment implies, 
according to Article 2( 1  ),  that "there shall  be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds 
of sex  either directly or indirectly"; 
a  national  rule  whereby,  when  women  and  men  who  are  candidates  for  the  same 
promotion arc equally qualified, women arc automatically to be given priority in sectors 
where they  are under-represented,  involves discrimination on grounds of sex. 
llowever, the Court considers that  it  is important to examine whether such  a national  rule is 
allowed by  Article 2(4) of the Directive.  In  this  respect, the Court states that this provision: 
is designed to allow measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact 
intended to  eliminate or reduce  actual  instances of inequality  which  may  exist  in  the 
reality of social  life; 
permits national measures relating to access to employment, including promotion, which 
give a specific advantage to women with a view to improving their ability to compete 
in  the labour market and to pursue a career on  an  equal  footing with men; 
as a derogation from  an individual right laid down in the Directive, must be interpreted 
strictly. 
Finally, the Court makes it clear that: 
national  rules  which  guarantee  woJncn  <!h~ohll~  and  !lO(:()!Idi_liorwl.  priority  for 
appointment  or promotion  go  beyond  promoting equal  opportunities and  overstep  the 
limits of the exception  in  Article 2(4) of the  Directive. 
5 The  Court  concludes  that  the  answer to  be  given  to  the  national  court's  question  is  that 
Article 2(1) and  (4) of Directive 76/207/EEC precludes national  mlcs such as those in the 
case  discussed  which,  where  candidates  of different  sexes  shortlisted  for  promotion  arc 
<:'qually  qualified,  automatically  give  priority  to  women  in  sectors  where  they  arc 
under-represented, under representation being deemed to exist when women do not make up 
at  least  half of the staff in the individual  pay brackets in the relevant personnel group or in 
the function  levels provided for_ in  the organization chart. 
5.  Quc~;tions raised hy the jmlgmrnt 
It appears that the Court's negative attitude towards the legality of the llrcmcn law is based 
exclusively  on  the  interpretation  which  should  be  given  to  Article  2(4)  of 
Directive 76/207/EEC.  It is clear from the judgment that this provision docs not cover the 
type of quota system under which women arc given illltomatic preference over men in  the 
assignment  of posts  or  promotion.  However,  a  number of questions  may  still  be  asked 
concerning Article 2('1)  Is this a provision limited to safeguarding positive actions in  favour 
of  wonH~n at  work only as regards measures such as special assistance for vocational training, 
leave  for  family  reasons,  etc,  or docs it  also  allow positive discrimination  in  the field  of 
recruitment/promotion by giving preference to women under certain conditions? In the latter 
case,  should  a  distinction  be  made  between  positive  actions  which  take  account  of 
considerations of necessity/proportionality and those which do not? 
Sa.  The lJS Supreme Court approach to "affirmative action" 
In  this  context,  it  is  interesting  to  recall  the  case-law  of the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United States  on  "affirmative  action"  which  demonstrates  that  the  issues  involved  arc 
extremely complex. The term "affirmative action" is used either to refer to action to identify 
and replace discrimination in employment or to measures aimed at increasing the participation 
in  the  workforce  of protected  groups,  i.e.  minorities  and  women.  There  is  a  difference 
between the public standard (under the Equal Protection Clause of the US Constitution) and 
the private standard (under title VJI  of the Civil  Rights Act  1964). 
Aflirrnativc action imposed by  law or adrniuistrativc action must be assessed according to a 
"strict scrutiny" standard, which requires the existence of a "compelling government interest" 
and nction "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest, i.e.  a requirement of p..m.nortionality.  In 
the private sector, the Supreme Court approach to voluntary affirmative action by employers 
i~  more  flexible  than  the  strict  scnrtiny. standard  since  it  concentrates  only  on  the  basic 
clements of the "narrowly-tailored" test. 
The only gender case, .lqlmsol}(X>, concerns voluntary affirmative action by private employers. 
In  this  ca~:e, an  affirmative action plan was applied in order to increase the representation of 
\vomen in  a job category  historic<~lly occupied by men.  A woman applicant was selected for 
the position over a male colleague, despite the fact that her test score was margin<~lly lower 
than the man's. This action was found  to be consistent with the prohibition of discrimination in employment 
imposed  under  title  VII  of the  Civil  Rights  Act  1964  on  the  grounds,  inter  alia,  that 
consideration  of the  sex  of the  applicant  was  justified  by  the  existence  of a  manifest 
imbalance  which  reflected  under-representation  of  women  in  "traditionally  segregated 
job categories". 
The Supreme Court has not decided any gender case concerning the public sector.  However, 
it is interesting to recall  the recent Adarand<
9
> case which concerned positive measures aimed 
at  improving  racial  balance  in  the  domain  of public  procurement.  In  this  case,  the 
Supreme Court  for  the  first  time  applied  strict  judicial  scrutiny  to  affirmative  action 
programmes  adopted  by  the  federal  government.  Although  the  particular  measure  under 
examination was deemed not to be sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to meet the required aim, 
it is important to note that  seven out of the nine members of the Supreme Court specifically 
reaffirmed,  as  a matter of principle, the legitimacy of results-oriented preferential treatment 
of disadvantaged groups,  subject always of course to the strict scrutiny requirements. 
Sb.  International Human Rights Law 
Discrimination based on sex is also prohibited by international law. However, the international 
instruments  of the  United  Nations  and  of the  Council  of Europe  tend  to  recognize  the 
legitimacy of certain  "special  measures" designed to establish de facto equality in  favour of 
certain disadvantaged groups.  The United Nations Convention of 18  December 1979 on  the 
elimination of all  forms of discrimination against women recognizes in  Article 4 that,  even 
if \Vomen  arc given de jure equality,  this docs  not  automatically guarantee that they  will  in 
reality  be  treated  equally.  To  accelerate  women's  de  f~tcto equality  in  society  and  in  the 
workplace,  States arc permitted to usc special  remedial measures for as long as inequalities 
continue to  exist. 
In  1988, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of  Discrimination against women 
adopted its general recommendation No  5 whereby the Committee recommended that States 
make more usc of temporary special measures such as  positive action,  preferential treatment 
or quota systems to advance women's integration into education, the economy,  politics and 
employment. These special  measures should be used simply to speed up the achievement of 
d~itcto equality for  women  and  should not create separate standards for  women and  men. 
The appropriateness of such measures should be evaluated with regard to the actual existence 
of discriminatory practices. 
Consequently, once the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment arc reached, those 
measures arc  no  longer needed  and  should be  discontinued. 
ILO Convention No  Ill of 4 June 1958 concerning discrimination in  respect of employment 
and occupation refers to both equality of opportunity _itnd  trcrrt!!lCnt by stating in Article 2 thnt 
each  member  for  which  this  Convention  is  in  force  undertakes  to  dcclrrrc  and  pursue  a 
national .  policy  designed  to  promote,  by  methods  appropriate  to  national  conditions  and 
practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of  employm~nt  and occupation, with 
a view to climin2ting any  discrimination in  re~;pcct thereof. 
('!) 
7 Article 5 of the ILO Convention is of particular importance in the present case as it states the 
following: 
"1.  Special  measures  of protection  or  assistance  provided  for  in  other  Conventions  or 
Recommendations adopted hy the International Labour Conference shall not be deemed 
to be discrimination. 
2.  Any  Member  may,  after  consultation  with  representative  employers'  and  workers' 
organizations, where such exist, determine that other special measures designed to meet 
the particular requirements of persons \Vho,  for  reasons such as sex,  age,  disablement, 
t~nnily responsibilities or social  or cultural  status,  arc generally  recognized to  require 
special  protection or assistance shall  not be deemed to be discrimination." 
The principle of equality of  opportunity and treatment for all workers is also enshrined in the 
declaration on equality of opportunity and treatment for women workers adopted by the ILO 
on  25  June  I  075.  Article  I  precludes all  forms of discrimination on grounds of sex  which 
deny  or  restrict  such  equality  and  also  provides  that  positive  special  treatment  during  a· 
transitional  period which aims at  effective equality between the sexes shall  not be regarded 
as discriminatory. 
Part II  of the additional protocol to the European Social Charter of 5 May 1988 provides, in 
Article I,  that the contracting parties undertake to recognize the right to equal opportunity and 
treatment in the field of employment without any discrimination based on sex, and to take the 
appropriate measures in  order to ensure or encourage its implementation in various sedors, 
including those or professional career and promotion. This provision is specifically stated not 
to impede the adoption of specific measures intended to remedy de C1cto  inequalities. 
The discussion is  still going on in the international human rights law context as to whether, 
and  to  \Vhat  extent,  mles  giving  women  automatic  priority  as  regards  appointment  or 
promotion arc permitted or not.  At the same tiwc it is clear that international human rights 
lmv docs not rule out- and rnay in  some instances even require -distinctions between men 
and  women  with  the  objective of accelerating  women's  d_Q  I:1<:1Jl  equality  in  society  Such 
distinctions,  on  the  other  hand,  should  be  based  on  objective  and  reasonable  criteria  and 
should not be aimed at  maintaining on a permanent basis unequal or separate standards. 
6.  How to interpret f(:danla• 
;\s has  already  been  mentioned  above,  there  arc various types of positive action.  One of 
them  may  take  the  form  of quota  systems  or  targets,  as  in  the  case  examined  by  the 
Court of Justice. The Court had to decide whether it was lawful, by applying such a system, 
to give women preference over male candidates in the event of a promotion in sectors where 
they  were  under-represented, provided that their qualifications were the same. 
The Court's answer to that question could be interpreted in two ways: 
either  the  Court  dismissed  the  possibility  of justifying  any  quota  system,  even  one 
containing a safeguard clause which allows the particular circumstances of a case to be 
taken into account, 
or the Court restricted  itself to  the  "rigid" quotas pmvided for in  the Bremen law :md 
<lflplied  to Mr Kalankc, that is in  an automatic manner. 
8 The  Commission  considers that  the  Court has  only  condemned the automatic quota system 
of the Land of Bremen. This interpretation is based upon the wording of the judgment itself 
whereby  the  Court  makes  it  clear that  national  rules  which  guarantee women  absolute and 
uncondition<1l  priority for appointment or promotion overstep the limits ofthe positive action 
exception  laid  down  in  Article  2(4)  of Directive  76/207/EEC  (sec  paragraph  22  of 
the judgment). 
It  is  true that,  in  paragraph 23,  the  Court refers to the problem of "substituting for equality 
of opportunity  ....  the  result  which  is  only  to  be  arrived  at  by  providing  such  equality  of 
opportunity''.  llowever,  this  paragraph  is  clearly  added  as  a rider  to  the  main  idea  of the 
Court,  contained  in  paragraph 22,  that it  is  the  "absolute and  unconditional"  nature  of the 
preference given to women which makes the Bremen system unlawful.  The Court's remarks 
in paragraph 23  arc clearly based on the assumption that it is discussing a rigid, unconditional 
quota  system.  Moreover,  tl~is  paragraph  appears  to  be  aimed  mainly  at  criticising  the 
over-ambitious elements of the particular scheme which was at issue in Kalankc, i.e.  the aim 
of achieving a 50/50 distribution of men  and women  "in all  grades and  levels".  Finally, it 
is  clear  that  the  Court  was  only  called  upon  to  pronounce  upon  systems  having  the 
characteristics  of the  Bremen  system,  and  the  operative  part  of the judgment is  naturally 
limited to pronouncing upon the legality of such systems.  It is also to be noted that the Court 
clearly recognized the need for measures going beyond the classic rules against discrimination 
if equality was to be achieved in  practice (paragraph 20). 
The Commission therefore takes the view that quota systems which fall  short of the degree 
of rigidity  and  automaticity  provided  for  by  the  Bremen  law  have  not  been  touched  by  the 
Court's judgment and  arc,  i  11  consequence,  to  be  regarded as lawful. 
In  this  context,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  following  positive  action  measures  arc 
examples of the types of action which remain untouched by  the Kalanke judgment, subject 
of course,  to the choice which  Member  States may  make as  to the measures to be adopted 
by  them: 
quotas linked to the qualifications required for the job, as long as they allow account to 
be taken of particular circumstances which might, in a given case, justify an  exception 
to the principle of giving preference to the under-represented sex; 
plans for promoting women, prescribing the proportions and the time-limits within which 
the number of women should be increased but without imposing an automatic preference 
mlc when individual  decisions on  recruitment and  promotion arc taken; 
an  obligation !!Lpcim:iple for  an  employer to  recruit or promote by  preference a person 
belonging to the under-represented sex; in  such a case, no individual right to he prefer red 
is  conferred on  any  person; 
reductions of social  security contributions which arc granted to  firms  when  they  recruit 
women  who return  to  the  labour market,  to  perform tasks in  ~a~ctors where women  me 
tt nd cr -represented; ~:;laic  .·;l,l•v<::idions  ~~ <•fl[t:d  iu  ,_-,nploy.:t ·"  wl10  rccruii  \-v(Hntn  in  seciocs  where  ik:;  '"·:-
under-represented; 
other  positive  action  measures  focusing  on  training,  professional  orientation,  the 
reorganization of working time,  child-care and  so on. 
In  respect of the positive action programme implemented by the Commission in  favour of its 
female staff, it should be noted that this is not prejudiced by the Kalankc judgment as it docs 
not  provide  for  women  to  be given  automatic  preference  (this  is  rather a principle to  be 
observed in  the case of equal qualifications). 
Conclusions 
The  Commission  considers  that  the  Court  has  only  condemned  the  special  feature  of the 
Dremen law which consists in the automaticity of  the measure, giving women an absolute and 
unconditional  right  to  appointment  or  promotion.  Therefore,  the  Commission  takes  the 
position that the only type of quota system which is unlawful is one which is completely rigid 
and  docs  not leave any  possibility  of taking account  of individual  circumstances.  Member 
States and  employers arc  thus  free  to  have  recourse  to  all  other forms  of positive  action, 
including flexible quotas. 
The Commission  is  anxious that  the controversy  to  which  the Kalankc case has given  rise 
should be ended definitively.  Therefore, notwithstanding the limited nature of the impact of 
this judgment as properly construed, the Commission believes that it  would  be helpful if the 
wording  of Article 2(4)  of Directive 76/207/EEC  were  amended  so  that  the  text  of the 
provision  would  specifically  permit  the  kinds  of positive  action  which  remain  untouched 
by  Kalankc.  Such  .11n  internrctn_tive  mnend_mcnt  would  make  it  clear that  positive  action 
measures short of rigid quotas arc permitted by  Community law and  would ensure that the 
text  of the  Directive  more  clearly  reflects  the  true  legal  position  as  it  results  from  the 
judgment of the Court.  . 
The Commission  is  therefore putting forward  a proposal for the amendment of Article 2(4) 
of Directive 76/207/EEC which would specify that the measures envisaged by this provision 
include actions favouring the recmitment or promotion of one sex in circumstances where the 
latter is under-represented, on condition that the employer always has the possibility of taking 
account of the  particular circumstances of a given case. 
10 